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For the last twenty years, or so, I’ve followed the Global Trends series that has been published every four years by the National Intelligence Council of the USA to coincide with each in-coming administration, and intended to serve as an unclassified strategic assessment of the key trends that might shape the world over the next 20 years. (https://www.dni.gov)
The Global Trends series is a unique effort by the U.S. intelligence community to provide transparent, forward-looking strategic analysis to both policymakers and the public. The apparent delay in the latest edition is notable and it occurs during a period of exceptional global economic uncertainty and geopolitical complexity that are necessarily challenging, and an environment that is less tolerant of independent ideas.
My own thoughts about the implications of change for the future have been forming since I read Sovereign Individual in 1997 (here) and then Shield of Achilles in 2002 (here).
Given the publication delay for this issue of Global Trends, I have collected my own ideas and developed this assessment of where I think the present trends might lead. My starting point was to draw up a list of the most significant trends that I have identified and some observations, and consider where they were going, collectively. I then used Perplexity to research, examine and validate these hypotheses independently, and then help with an initial draft for what’s set out below. For transparency, the Appendix contains the complete prompt that I used.
In this, I have avoided being sucked into a discussion of the present situation in the USA since it seems to me that this is simply one example of what has happened and is happening now, elsewhere, albeit with great potency. He does merit a brief mention, though.
I look forward to hearing your thoughts should you wish to tell me! [email protected]
Peter Osborn
27 April, 2025
The Transformation of Global Power and Societies:
Trends, Interactions, and Futures 2025-2045
The first quarter of the 21st century has witnessed an unprecedented acceleration of transformative forces that are challenging and reshaping the fundamental structures of human society. These forces are not parallel developments but are deeply interconnected drivers of change that are simultaneously eroding the traditional structures of power and societies, and enabling the emergence of new ones.
From revolutionising warfare through technological innovation to the fragmentation of social cohesion, from the decline in deference to authority to the rise of populist movements, these trends represent a complex web of interconnected cause and effect that seem highly likely to dramatically reshape our world by 2045.
This research note examines twelve key trends already in motion and analyses how their continued development and interaction are likely to transform societies over the next two decades, with particular attention to their impact on established political constructs such as the USA and EU. Four distinct, plausible scenarios are described in declining order of likelihood.
This is intended as a reference point against which to anticipate the challenges that lie ahead, consider the range of possible futures that may emerge from this period of unprecedented change, and observe the unfolding drama.
Executive Summary
This research paper analyses twelve interconnected trends that have been observed reshaping global power structures and the organisation of societies, with particular focus on their implications for the USA, EU, and other significant political entities, over the next twenty years. These trends include the technological transformation of warfare, the shift from geographical to affinity-based communities, declining institutional deference, eroding nation-state legitimacy, digital penetration, social polarisation, power diffusion to a multipolar world, rising populism, climate pressures, digital isolation, AI displacement of human functions, and demographic collapse in affluent regions.
The analysis indicates that these trends are mutually reinforcing with few natural counterbalances, heading in the direction of increased fragmentation of traditional political structures, growing inequality in power distribution, and heightened potential for both inter- and intra-state conflicts. There appear to be four plausible outcomes by 2045:
1) Network States and Corporate Sovereigns, where traditional nation-states cede significant power to networked communities and corporate entities;
2) Authoritarian Consolidation, marked by the ascent of technology-enabled autocratic regimes;
3) Fractured Regions and Contested Spaces, characterised by the breakdown of large states into smaller competing entities; and
4) Democratic Renaissance through Restructuring, where democratic systems adapt through radical institutional reforms.
The evidence suggests the first two scenarios are substantially more likely than the latter two, with significant implications for governance, security, and social cohesion worldwide. Of course, the actual outcome may contain elements of several of these with other components that are not yet visible.
The Shifting Foundations of Global Order
Technological Disruption and Military Transformation
The nature of military power and conflict is undergoing fundamental transformation. The traditional drivers of military strength – manpower reserves and industrial capacity – have been overtaken by technological ingenuity, innovation and sophistication. Dual use consumer devices and the increasing sophistication and availability of AI, autonomous systems, and precision weaponry are all redefining military effectiveness, thereby overturning the link between force and resources that has determined the ability to project power since the beginning of time. Greater nations and empires were needed to increase resources to increase power; for the first time in history this no longer applies.
This shift creates both opportunities and vulnerabilities for established powers. While advanced nations invest heavily in technological solutions to offset manpower shortages, these technologies face significant implementation challenges. The Ukraine conflict has exposed the way that critical manpower shortages limit traditional military engagement and, simultaneously demonstrates the potential for novel and inexpensive deployment of technology.
This technology revolution extends military capability far beyond state actors. As new technologies become more sophisticated, available and deployable without the need for large scale finance, manpower and other resources, non-state actors can possess the ability to project violence, near and at a distance, that was once restricted to nation-states. This diffusion of military technology undermines the traditional state monopoly on violence, a cornerstone of the nation-state for centuries.
The drones let loose by the Houthis in Yemen cost them about $2,000 apiece, but the US military spend some $2m to shoot each of them down.
Social Fragmentation and Identity Realignment
Digital communication technologies have fundamentally altered how human communities form, interact and identify. Affinity groups increasingly organize around shared beliefs, interests, and values rather than geographic proximity-shifting from “people near me” to “people like me”. This transformation undermines the geographic basis upon which nation-states and representative democracy were built by making borders irrelevant.
Digital environments where participants encounter only primarily beliefs that reinforce their existing perspectives, are particularly prevalent. Algorithms that steer users and content towards one another are everywhere and accelerate polarisation by limiting exposure to diversity and reinforcing existing beliefs and preferences, increasingly insulating users from contrasting perspectives.
This digital-driven social fragmentation interacts with broader trends in society. Economic inequality, eroding community structures, and diminished trust in institutions further accelerate social division. These factors combine to create societies increasingly stratified along ideological, cultural, and economic lines-undermining diversity and consensus that are the foundations of democratic governance.
The Multipolar Power Shift
Western dominance of the global order, particularly USA hegemony, continues to erode in favour of a fragmented and multipolar world. The relative decline of U.S. global influence manifests in diminishing leadership authority in conflict resolution and strategic missteps in regions like Afghanistan and the Middle East.
The tensions within politically constructed “nations” has been creating social conflict and fragmentation. Tribal and religious confrontation has long been a feature of the Middle East, and countries such as Yugoslavia have fallen apart. Spain is a political construction that has been resisted and tested for decades. Devolution is motivated by the same underlying tensions and often seeks merely to pre-empt more explosive solutions. There are efforts by Russia to reverse this trend by traditional, Twentieth Century military methods and political subterfuge, but they have been punishingly costly and the jury is still out as to the success and sustainability of all this.
At the same time, economic power continues shifting away from the West. There are projections indicating that by 2045, those other nations will hold 52% of the global economy, driven in large part by China and India. This economic realignment accelerates changes in geopolitical influence and military capabilities.
The international environment is becoming more contested across multiple domains, with technology, finance, trade, and human resources increasingly organized into competing systems, often overlapping one another. This polarisation, particularly between Western and Eastern spheres of influence, creates new challenges for international coordination on critical global issues like climate change, technological governance, and security architecture.
Critical Acceleration Factors
Climate Destabilization and Resource Competition
Climate change represents a critical accelerant to existing geopolitical trends. Current projections indicate global warming will exceed the Paris Agreement’s 2°C threshold by approximately 2045. This trajectory will intensify competition for increasingly scarce resources, particularly water, and drive displacement and migration on unprecedented scales.
The social and political ramifications of climate destabilisation extend beyond physical impacts. Climate-driven resource scarcity and migration patterns will intensify xenophobia and populist responses in receiving nations, further straining democratic governance models. Simultaneously, states and non-state actors with control over critical resources (particularly water and arable land) will gain disproportionate influence in regional power dynamics.
Demographic Transformation
Collapsing birth rates in affluent regions represent a structural constraint on future economic and military capabilities. Nations with aging and shrinking populations face increasing challenges in maintaining economic productivity, funding social welfare programs, and military forces with technology and manpower.
This demographic transition creates incentives for both technological solutions (automation, AI) and policy responses (immigration, family formation incentives). However, these responses often trigger political backlash, particularly as they intersect with identity politics and economic insecurity. The uneven global distribution of demographic decline – concentrated in wealthy nations – further accelerates power shifts toward younger, growing populations primarily in the Global South.
Artificial Intelligence and Human Disintermediation
The rapid advancement of AI systems is enabling the replacement of human intermediaries across multiple domains of economic and social activity. This disintermediation extends beyond routine tasks to increasingly sophisticated creative, analytical, and decision-making functions previously considered uniquely human.
As AI systems become more sophisticated and autonomous, they increasingly communicate and interact with other AI systems, potentially creating decision architectures that distance humans from control processes, and further controlling exposure to diversity of information and ideas. This technological evolution concentrates power in those who control these systems while potentially attenuating democratic oversight and human agency in critical decisions.
Trump
The attitudes and methods and, possibly, the objectives of Donald Trump and his adherents appear to be little different from others described here in type. They are unusual, though, in scale, reach and, therefor, in significance, and have to be listed as an accelerating force. It’s fascinating that there are fundamental differences between Trump’s objectives and those of Putin and Xi: he is forcing fundamental change in what is, whereas they are attempting to perpetuate and strengthen what has been.
Four Possible Futures: 2045 Scenarios
Scenario 1: Network States and Corporate Sovereigns (Highest Likelihood)
By 2045, traditional nation-states have not disappeared but have been forced to share sovereignty with powerful non-geographic entities – both community-based “network states” (formal or informal governance structures organized around shared identity, ideology or interest rather than territory) and corporate sovereigns (companies that have acquired state-like powers and responsibilities).
Technological platforms have evolved into governance systems, providing identity management, dispute resolution, financial services, and even security arrangements for their users. These systems are often borderless, allowing individuals to choose their primary “citizenship” based on values alignment rather than birth location. The most successful network states span traditional political boundaries, creating a layer of governance that operates alongside geographic nations.
Major technology corporations have assumed quasi-governmental roles, operating their own legal systems, currencies, and security forces. These corporate sovereigns exert influence comparable to mid-sized nations but lack traditional democratic accountability mechanisms. Instead, they operate on marketplace principles – entities that fail to satisfy their “citizens” lose them to competitors.
Traditional nation-states like those in the EU have fractured into more localized governance units while delegating certain functions upward to supranational entities or outward to corporate and network partners. The USA has maintained nominal unity but functions as a much looser federation with states exercising significantly more autonomy and forming cross-border arrangements with like-minded entities.
Power in this world is highly distributed and unequal. Those with access to advanced technology and membership in prosperous networks enjoy unprecedented freedom and opportunity, while those excluded from these systems face marginalisation. Political conflict centres on the boundaries and relationships between these overlapping sovereign entities.
This scenario is considered most likely because it represents an evolution of existing trends rather than a revolutionary break. We already see the early stages of corporate sovereign behavior in technology platforms and the nascent development of network states in various online communities. The declining capacity of traditional states creates vacuums that these alternative structures naturally fill.
Scenario 2: Authoritarian Consolidation (High Likelihood)
By 2045, many formerly democratic nations have evolved into sophisticated techno-authoritarian systems. These regimes maintain democratic appearances while employing advanced surveillance, AI-driven social management, and information control to maintain power. This transition has occurred gradually through democratic backsliding rather than sudden coups.
In this world, authoritarian systems have proven more capable of managing the disruptions caused by climate change, demographic decline, and technological unemployment than their democratic counterparts. Their ability to implement long-term planning without electoral constraints and to maintain social order through surveillance and controlled information environments has given them significant advantages.
The remnants of liberal democracy exist primarily in smaller, wealthy nations with strong historical democratic institutions, but even these have adopted more authoritarian elements in the face of ongoing crises. The EU has fragmented, with some members joining authoritarian blocs while others maintain a smaller, more homogeneous union. The USA remains formally democratic but functions as a managed democracy with severely constrained political competition and extensive surveillance.
Power in this world is concentrated in state structures, but these structures are highly intertwined with corporate entities, especially in technology and security sectors. The distinction between state and corporate power has blurred, creating systems that combine the worst aspects of both – using market mechanisms to implement authoritarian control.
This scenario is considered highly likely because authoritarian systems have demonstrated advantages in crisis management and stability maintenance during periods of rapid change. The technologies enabling surveillance and social control are developing rapidly, while countervailing democratic forces are weakening due to polarisation and legitimacy crises.
Scenario 3: Fractured Regions and Contested Spaces (Moderate Likelihood)
By 2045, many large nation-states have broken down into smaller political entities organised around regional identity, resource access, or ideological alignment. This fragmentation has resulted from the cumulative stresses of climate disruption, economic transformation, and identity politics overwhelming central authority.
The former USA exists as a loose confederation of regional blocs with significantly different governance systems, economic models, and international alignments. Some regions maintain close ties with corporate or network entities, while others have reverted to more traditional state structures. The EU has similarly fragmented along both national and regional lines, with cross-border entities forming based on shared interests or identities.
In this divided landscape, security has become highly localised, with regions maintaining their own defence capabilities and forming fluid alliance structures. The military technology revolution has accelerated this process by making smaller forces more viable through technological force multipliers. Proxy conflicts between competing regions and their external backers are common.
Power in this world is highly contested and constantly shifting. No single model of governance has proven definitively superior, leading to ongoing experimentation and competition. International institutions have largely collapsed or become forums for alliance-building rather than genuine global governance.
This scenario is considered moderately likely because while the stresses pushing toward fragmentation are strong, there remain powerful forces supporting larger political units, including security concerns, economic efficiencies, and identity attachments. The transition to this highly fragmented world would likely involve significant conflict that might be avoided through other adaptation paths.
Scenario 4: Democratic Renaissance through Restructuring (Lowest Likelihood)
By 2045, democratic systems have undergone radical innovation to adapt to changed conditions, creating new forms of representative governance that maintain core democratic values while addressing the challenges of the mid-21st century.
These restructured democracies have embraced multi-layered governance, explicitly acknowledging that different issues require decision-making at different scales – from local to global. They have incorporated elements of random selection of citizens for governance roles alongside traditional elections, developed new deliberative processes enhanced by AI facilitation, and created innovative accountability mechanisms for transnational issues.
In this world, the USA has reformed its constitutional structure to address polarisation and representation challenges, creating a more flexible federalism that allows for greater regional variation while maintaining national cohesion on core issues. The EU has evolved into a more complete political union with clearer democratic legitimacy, while developing mechanisms for collaboration with other democratic entities globally.
These restructured democracies have proven surprisingly resilient in the face of technological and environmental challenges. By explicitly addressing representation deficits and developing more responsive institutions, they have rebuilt public trust and legitimacy. Their openness to innovation and adaptation has allowed them to incorporate beneficial aspects of network governance while maintaining democratic accountability.
Power in this world remains distributed but is exercised through more legitimate and transparent processes. The clear demarcation of decision rights at different governance levels has reduced conflict and improved effectiveness. Technology serves democratic processes rather than undermining them.
This scenario is considered least likely because it requires overcoming strong vested interests, addressing deep polarisation, and implementing innovative models without historical precedent – all while managing ongoing crises. However, it remains possible if sufficient political will emerges from crisis conditions, perhaps led by smaller democratic nations that successfully pioneer new governance approaches.
Conclusion
The transformation of global power structures over the next twenty years presents profound challenges to existing governance models, particularly in the USA, EU, and similar democratic systems. The interaction of technological, social, political, and environmental trends is creating conditions that undermine many assumptions underlying current institutional arrangements.
While the four scenarios presented offer different visions of how these transformations might unfold, they all suggest a fundamental restructuring of authority and legitimacy by 2045. Whether through the rise of network states and corporate sovereigns, the consolidation of technological authoritarianism, the fragmentation into smaller political units, or the radical reinvention of democratic structures, the world of 2045 will likely operate on significantly different principles than today’s international system.
The challenge for policymakers, business leaders, and civil society is to recognise these emerging dynamics early enough to shape them toward more beneficial outcomes. While some aspects of these transformations appear inevitable, their specific manifestations and human impacts remain subject to collective choices and interventions.
Appendix 1: Original Prompt
Tasks:
Research and test the hypothetical long term trends and observations below, and summarise the conclusions that you reach about them.
Examine the implications of these trends and their interactions over the next twenty years for the societies within political constructs such as the USA and EU in particular, and other nation state groupings where these trends are likely to undermine stability.
Draw out four possible outcomes towards the end of that period, discuss the centres of power that are likely in each and argue the likelihood or otherwise of each. Present these in declining order of likelihood.
Begin your output with a short, two paragraph introduction, followed by an executive summary of the entire report.
Reproduce this complete prompt in an appendix.
Guidance:
Be vigilant throughout about missing the significant nuances and giving undue weight to the headlines.
Be careful about timelines, avoiding simplistic near-term extrapolation of today’s circumstances, and focusing instead on insights across the period and related to the endpoint in particular.
Write in clear British English
-oOo-
Trends:
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The drivers of military effectiveness are trending from industrial capacity and manpower, towards innovative and ingenious uses of technology, and this is changing the nature of conflict and the identities of those engaged in it.
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There is a trend in society, driven by widespread access to communication, from affinity groupings being “people near me” to being “people like me”
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Over at least two centuries, there has been a significant decline in deference.
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The legitimacy of geographical, nation-based, government has been steadily eroding, compromising tax raising and other traditional governmental functions.
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Digital technology has resulted in the ever increasing penetration of devices and other mechanisms for direct access to others: one to one and one to many.
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Societies are becoming more and more polarised and fragmented.
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Power centres are flowing away from the West the dominance of the USA and geographical actors, towards a world that is more fragmented and multipolar, with the growing importance of and tensions with international corporations, and other supra-national and non-state actors.
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Recent decades have seen a steady rise in political populism and autocracies
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Water and climate are steadily becoming more influential factors
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Digital communication devices have penetrated deep into the lives of most people and, for many, they are crowding out other forms of interpersonal interaction, such as face to face, especially among younger people.
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AI and other digital systems are steadily replacing and crowding out humans in content generation, presentation, as well as search mechanisms and content interpretation. AI systems are beginning to interact with one another, too, thereby further dis-intermediating humans.
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Birth rates are collapsing in more affluent regions
Observations:
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democracy depends on consensus and the fragmentation of location based communities into narrow, dissimilar interest affiliations is steadily undermining the effectiveness of democracy as an organising system.
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most of these trends are reinforcing one another, with no obvious mechanism that will change or halt the direction of travel
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these trends are often a combination of cause and effect, being the effect of earlier causes and, themselves causing or driving others
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digital infrastructure is now critical to the functioning of all aspects of society, with highly significant implications for the exercise of power , and major disruption cause by either bad actors or accident
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Centres of influence, power and control are becoming highly concentrated
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The opinions of individuals are increasingly open to manipulation, and exposure to a range of ideas, meeting questioning, curious and thoughtful attitudes becomes less and less commonplace
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as issues become increasingly complex and nuanced, they meet ever shorter attention spans and less willingness to go beyond superficialities. This creates growing opportunities for populists with seemingly easy solutions, and fertile minds among those feeling disempowered that are ready to adopt conspiracy theories to explain their circumstances
Appendix II: Citations
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- https://www.water.org.uk/sites/default/files/wp/2022/06/Water-UK-Water-2050-A-White-Paper-3.pdf
- https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20240612-the-people-making-ai-sound-more-human
- https://www.euronews.com/health/2024/03/21/global-infertility-rate-will-cause-a-dramatic-decline-in-population-in-97-of-countries-by-
- https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/9789811252587_0006
- https://explodingtopics.com/blog/military-technology-trends
- https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/publications/research-studies/the-role-of-non-state-actors-as-proxies-in-irregular-warfare-and-malign-state-influence/
- https://www.wzaponline.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/InductrialRevolution.292125935.pdf
- https://www.democracy.uci.edu/files/docs/conferences/2011/Decline_Revisited_%20Evidence_after_25_Years_Neil_Nevitte.pdf
- https://www.southampton.ac.uk/news/2025/02/democracy-in-crisis-trust-in-democratic-institutions-declining-around-the-world.page
- https://www.numberanalytics.com/blog/emerging-defense-trends-global-security
- https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/aerospace-and-defense/our-insights/a-rising-wave-of-tech-disruptors-the-future-of-defense-innovation
- http://roke.co.uk/discover-the-latest-innovation-insights-roke/defence-technology-trends-to-watch-for-in-2025
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- https://www.dcicontracts.com/key-defence-technology-trends-to-watch-in-2025/
- https://www.howgatepublishing.com/product-page/VNSA
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_warfare
- https://www.dni.gov/index.php/gt2040-home/gt2040-deeper-looks/future-of-the-battlefield
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Violent_non-state_actor
- https://indiandefenceindustries.in/notes/evolution-of-warfare-1
- https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/defense-technology-monitor/how-tech-innovations-are-changing-the-trajectory-of-military-competitions-and-conflicts/
- https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19448953.2023.2233364
- https://www.reddit.com/r/TheFirstLaw/comments/1fg69mf/industrial_technology_versus_military_technology/
- https://www.insight.com/en_US/content-and-resources/gated/4-technology-trends-impacting-effective-military-operations-ac1290.html
- https://edu.gcfglobal.org/en/digital-media-literacy/how-filter-bubbles-isolate-you/1/
- https://chronus.com/blog/blog-affinity-groups
- https://www.reddit.com/r/socialanxiety/comments/1dpnklg/why_do_you_want_people_to_like_you/
- https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/articles/zd9tt39
- https://www.a-m-a.co.uk/affinity-groups/
- https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/its-all-about-the-dads/201809/affinity-seeking-in-families-or-do-you-like-me
- https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4937233/
- https://www.culturalheritage.org/membership/committees/equity-and-inclusion/equity-inclusion-resources/affinity-groups
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- https://www.nbcnews.com/better/lifestyle/problem-social-media-reinforcement-bubbles-what-you-can-do-about-ncna1063896
- https://hbanet.org/membership/affinity-groups
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- https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14780038.2019.1704453
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- https://theconversation.com/trust-in-politics-is-in-long-term-decline-around-the-world-new-research-250078
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- https://www.statista.com/statistics/632599/smartphone-market-share-by-vendor-in-europe/
- https://ourpublicservice.org/publications/state-of-trust-in-government-2024/
- https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/en/blog/2024/trust-crisis-europes-social-contract-under-threat
- https://www.statista.com/statistics/201184/percentage-of-mobile-phone-users-who-use-a-smartphone-in-the-us/
- https://www.canalys.com/newsroom/europe-smartphone-market-Q1-2024
- https://www.cps.gwu.edu/post-election-poll-shows-eroding-trust-government-and-sources-information
- https://www.veriangroup.com/news-and-insights/trust-in-the-eu-national-parliament-and-national-government
- https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2024/01/31/americans-use-of-mobile-technology-and-home-broadband/
- https://www.statista.com/topics/3341/smartphone-market-in-europe/
- https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/09/19/americans-feelings-about-politics-polarization-and-the-tone-of-political-discourse/
- https://theloop.ecpr.eu/what-explains-the-global-appeal-of-authoritarian-populism/
- https://www.statista.com/chart/33419/rating-of-political-stance-ci/
- https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/01/businesses-need-geopolitical-muscle-multipolar-world/
- https://news.berkeley.edu/2025/01/21/theres-a-term-for-trumps-political-style-authoritarian-populism/
- https://news.gallup.com/poll/655190/political-parties-historically-polarized-ideologically.aspx
- https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/05/usa-china-multipolar-bipolar-unipolar/
- https://theloop.ecpr.eu/how-to-understand-the-rise-of-authoritarian-populism/
- https://www.facinghistory.org/resource-library/political-polarization-united-states
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- https://www.cato.org/commentary/terrifying-rise-authoritarian-populism
- https://phys.org/news/2024-10-political-polarization-unique.html
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- https://www.nasa.gov/centers-and-facilities/ames/nasa-study-reveals-compounding-climate-risks-at-two-degrees-of-warming/
- https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/reports
- https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00139157.2025.2434494
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